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Essay 
 
More Than What Courts Do: Jurisprudence, 
Decision, and Dignity—In Brief Encounters and 
Global Affairs 
 
Robert D. Sloane† 
 
Any law that uplifts human personality is just. 
Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. 
—Martin Luther King, Jr.1 
 
Describing Baruch de Spinoza, Matthew Stewart wrote: 
Some philosophers merely argue their philosophies. When they finish their disputations, 
they hang up the tools of their trade, go home, and indulge in the well-earned pleasures of 
private life. Other philosophers live their philosophies. They treat as useless any 
philosophy that does not determine the manner in which they spend their days, and they 
consider pointless any part of life that has no philosophy in it. They never go home.2 
The same, perhaps, may be said of jurisprudence. If so, then, like Spinoza, W. 
Michael Reisman, this conference’s honoree, falls clearly into the latter 
category. His jurisprudence informs his work and his life—as a scholar, 
teacher, practitioner, friend, and public citizen. Having been privileged to 
know or work with him in most of these capacities, I have often been struck 
by how the methods and injunctions of the New Haven School shape his 
personal, no less than professional, character traits. He exhibits an acute 
sensitivity to context, cultivates a studied habit of disengaging from biases, 
and always reflects on arguments before replying: he responds rather than 
reacts. Not coincidentally, the New Haven School encourages these traits, and 
no living scholar or practitioner is identified more closely with it than 
Reisman. Below, beyond describing some precepts of the School, I want to 
focus on a few areas in which Reisman made signature contributions to its 
jurisprudence of realistic idealism.  
In many introductory jurisprudence courses, students learn that the topic 
asks two fundamental questions: first, what distinguishes legal norms from 
other norms, for example, those of etiquette (theories of law); and second, 
how do, or should, judges decide hard cases, that is, those in which the law 
does not clearly dictate a single right answer (theories of adjudication)? For 
the international lawyer, it should be immediately apparent that the utility of 
both questions is profoundly limited. Consider their respective assumptions: 
first, that qualitative features of certain norms (pedigree or other criteria of 
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1. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM CITY JAIL (1963), reprinted in A 
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 289, 293 
(James Melvin Washington ed., 1986). 
2. MATTHEW STEWART, THE COURTIER AND THE HERETIC 54 (2006). 
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legal validity) do distinguish genuine legal norms from other sorts of norms; 
and second, that judges constitute the paradigmatic, if not exclusive, appliers 
of law. 
In the notoriously decentralized and often unstable international legal 
system, neither assumption necessarily holds. International lawyers must 
ascertain the extent to which a host of putative governing norms (whether 
traditionally deemed legal or not) affect the decisions of diverse, politically 
relevant actors, 3  meaning those with effective power in equally diverse 
contexts: from domestic courts to sui generis international tribunals to 
diplomatic fora to “informal channels”4 that many might not even recognize 
as jurisgenerative. And despite the proliferation of international tribunals,5 it is 
still true that comparatively little international law is made, interpreted, or 
enforced by courts—a fortiori if, by courts, we mean domestic courts within a 
hierarchical legal system with reliable and effective enforcement powers.  
That is why Reisman has repeatedly stressed that Holmes’s aphorism—
that “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do . . . are what I mean by the 
law”6—is so misguided in international law.7 Outside the few contexts in 
which authority (legitimacy) and control (power) converge in a tribunal of 
some sort, the international lawyer would be professionally derelict to make 
decisions or advise clients based on a jurisprudence conceived in terms of a 
hierarchy of courts applying appropriately pedigreed norms. International 
lawyers, in particular, but indeed all lawyers, need a methodology that can 
capture the myriad facts and factors that influence the processes of decision in 
different legal and political contexts.  
Most jurisprudential scholarship regrettably offers them little help.8 In 
his “Short Guide for the Perplexed” to the “Hart-Dworkin” debate,9 Scott 
Shapiro notes that this debate has dominated jurisprudential scholarship in the 
United States for more than forty years, since Ronald Dworkin published The 
Model of Rules in 1967, critiquing H.L.A. Hart’s influential reformulation of 
legal positivism.10 Remarkably, however, and all the more so because Hart 
devoted a chapter to international law in The Concept of Law,11 one searches 
the literature on the Hart-Dworkin debate in vain for further attention to 
international law. Of course, international lawyers have engaged in their own 
vibrant debate about the nature of international law, generating sundry 
                                                                                                                                                                         
3. Myres S. McDougal et al., Theories About International Law: Prologue to a 
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT’L L. 188, 189-92 (1968). 
4. W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of 
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS 3, 13 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard 
eds., 1988). 
5. See Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good 
or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 267, 268-69 (2001). 
6. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). 
7. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 4, at 10-11. 
8. Jeremy Waldron’s work stands out as an exception. E.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of 
International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 15 (2006); see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS 238-45 (1980) (conceptualizing customary international law). 
9. Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in 
RONALD DWORKIN 22 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007). 
10. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967). 
11. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-37 (2d ed. 1994). 
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jurisprudential schools analogous to those in the domestic arena.12 But most 
mainstream theories of law still tend to beg the question of international law’s 
status by presupposing the apparatus of a functional state as the paradigm of 
real law. 
This is unfortunate and ironic. Hart aspired to elucidate the concept of 
law, not of any particular legal system.13 He concluded that international law, 
while perhaps not to be derided in Austinian terms as mere “positive 
morality,”14  lacks the secondary rules that characterize all mature legal 
systems.15 Yet perspective, as the New Haven School insists, is crucial. Within 
a statist paradigm, the conclusion that international law lacks what Hart called 
secondary rules is virtually tautological. Disengaged from those tacit 
assumptions, I believe it is clear that international law does have secondary 
rules—or their rough analogue, what the New Haven School denotes 
constitutive processes, viz., decisions about how decisions will be made, 
where, and by whom. It is just that those processes bear scant resemblance to 
the formal symbols and institutions of law in states. Their complexity, 
dynamism, and sensitivity to power also render the idea of capturing them in a 
monolithic rule of recognition even more fanciful than in the domestic 
sphere.16 If Hart therefore erred in denying that international law is genuine 
law, then it should stand as an objection to any theory of law writ large that it 
cannot comprehend the international legal system or offer international 
lawyers practical guidance. For jurisprudence is not, or should not be, a 
pejoratively academic enterprise. In fact, international lawyers, even more 
than their domestic counterparts, have a deeply practical need to understand 
how the legal system in which they operate actually functions. Only then can 
they responsibly and accurately determine whether and how they might 
influence it. 
To those familiar with his work, it will come as no surprise that 
Reisman, like his intellectual forebears Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. 
Lasswell, always took a dim view of positivism, critiquing it on descriptive 
and normative grounds.17 In part, this is because its explanatory force is so 
manifestly weak in the international sphere. In part, it is because some early 
and unsophisticated forms of legal positivism, at bottom, mistakenly equate 
law with naked power. But it is also, in part, because positivism purports to be 
purely descriptive.18 Like the American legal realists, whom the New Haven 
School critiqued but upon whose insights it simultaneously built,19 Reisman 
regards jurisprudence as inescapably—and appropriately—normative. 
Pretense to a value-free jurisprudence at best obscures normative goals. In 
                                                                                                                                                                         
12. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 187-90 
(1996). 
13. HART, supra note 11, at 239-40. 
14. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (David Campbell & Philip 
Thomas eds., Dartmouth Publ’g 1998) (1832). 
15. See HART, supra note 11, at 236-37. 
16. Cf. Dworkin, supra note 10, at 41-42 (analogous critique in the domestic legal sphere). 
17. See generally McDougal et al., supra note 3, at 243-60. 
18. See id. at 247. 
19. W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 108 YALE 
L.J. 935, 936-37 (1999). 
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fact, if the New Haven School has a birth date, it is the 1943 publication of 
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public 
Interest, in which McDougal and Lasswell argued in relevant part: 
Even those who still insist that policy is no proper concern of a law school tacitly 
advocate a policy, unconsciously assuming that the ultimate function of law is to 
maintain existing social institutions in a sort of timeless statu quo [sic]; what they ask is 
that their policy be smuggled in, without insight or responsibility.20  
Indeed, McDougal and Lasswell conceptually linked the pretense to a policy-
neutral legal education to the “outburst of racialism in [Nazi] Germany, . . . 
one of several profound recessions from the ideal of deference for the dignity 
and worth of the individual.”21 From the outset, they therefore insisted on the 
indispensability of goal clarification, or the identification of preferred 
policies—a project unified by the moral postulate that law’s ultimate goal 
should be to promote human dignity. Only after clarifying the policies to be 
pursued can lawyers responsibly perform their quintessential task: to make, or 
help others to make, decisions. And the continuous process of authoritative 
and controlling decision is, in the New Haven School’s view, law itself. 
This may initially seem counterintuitive. In liberal democracies, lawyers 
grow accustomed to conceptualizing decisionmaking as a function that 
follows, rather than precedes, identification of law. But law, like everything 
else, is in a constant state of flux. The decisions of judges, executive officials, 
administrative officers, and other elites—those who qualify as politically 
relevant actors in liberal democracies—tend to be far more predictable than 
those made in the international legal system because of the congruence of 
expectations of authority and control in a well-ordered state. Still, it is the 
process of authoritative and controlling decision about the distribution of 
values that constitutes law in the sense that matters to clients. That is why 
Reisman often stresses that to be truly effective, lawyers must distinguish a 
legal system’s “myth system” from its “operational code.”22 As he wrote in 
one characteristic exposition: 
Whatever you may mean by law, [clients] have a practical interest in how things are done 
in a certain setting and by law they mean those expectations shared by relevant members 
of the group about the right way of doing things, expectations taken seriously enough by 
group members so that they will probably be sustained by some individual or group 
effort.23  
Analytically, Reisman and his colleagues therefore conceptualized law-
making, or norm prescription, in terms of three coordinate communicative 
dimensions: (1) policy content, the extent to which a norm communicates a 
directive or prohibition: “thou shalt” or “thou shalt not”; (2) authority signal, 
the extent to which, empirically, the processes generating that norm and the 
symbols attached to it convey a sense of legitimacy or propriety to the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
20. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: 
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 207 (1943). 
21. Id. 
22. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS 16 (1979). 
23. W. Michael Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 
1, 2 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1981). 
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normative communication’s recipients; and (3) control intention, the extent to 
which those recipients expect that those with effective power will invest 
sufficient resources to make the norm effective—in common parlance, to 
enforce it.24 All norms vary in clarity or strength along these dimensions. By 
methodically inquiring into each, the lawyer will be able to advise clients and 
shape the law far more effectively than by focusing solely on the familiar 
epistemic units of state law: statutes, administrative rules, appellate decisions, 
and other sources.25 
 Of course, in a well-ordered legal system like that of the United States, 
lawyers at times justifiably assume that authority and control will converge in 
identifiable institutions, especially courts. That is why appellate decisions 
generally offer a reliable prophecy of “what the courts will do in fact.”26 
Given the authority of courts in the United States and their reliable ability to 
enforce their decisions with state coercion, it is also why the prophecies of 
what the courts will do matter so much to U.S. clients. Yet it would be a 
manifestly catastrophic mistake to transpose Holmes’s maxim to, say, 
nineteenth-century Venezuela, in which the formal trappings of a legal 
system—replete with jurists, courts, legislators, executive agents, and so 
forth—existed but in fact served as a veneer for caudillismo (de facto rule by a 
“strong man or Boss to whom subordinates owe personal rather than formal 
authority”).27 Still, many lawyers assume, consciously or not, that Holmes’s 
vision can be transposed to the international legal system: small wonder that 
they conclude, with Austin, that there is no international law “properly so-
called.” To be effective in the international system, lawyers must scrutinize 
unfamiliar epistemic units, well beyond case law and texts. They must 
appreciate how the social processes to which international law is attached 
work, viz., who actually makes authoritative and controlling decisions—
where, when, and how.  
Ironically, many critique the New Haven School as impracticable—too 
abstruse to be useful to practitioners.28 Nothing could be further from the 
truth, and Reisman’s work, as a scholar and practitioner, is living proof. The 
School’s methodology is not easy. In its quest for informed decision in the 
service of clear goals, it seeks comprehensively to map and scrutinize the 
factors, which, within any legal system, will be genuinely enlightening. It has 
developed methodical modes of inquiry in this regard, drawn from the social 
sciences, which seem almost Aristotelian in their precision and categories: 
                                                                                                                                                                         
24. See generally W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of 
Communication, The Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture (Apr. 24, 1981), in 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 101 (1981). 
25. Reisman, supra note 4, at 5-8. 
26. Id. at 9; see also Holmes, supra note 6, at 461. 
27. W. Michael Reisman, Book Review, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 727, 727-28 (1981) (reviewing 
ROGELIO PÉREZ PERDOMO, EL FORMALISMO JURÍDICO Y SUS FUNCIONES SOCIALES EN EL SIGLO XIX 
VENEZOLANO (1978)) (describing the coexistence of legal formalism and the operational code of 
caudillismo in nineteenth-century Venezuela). Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence and, in 
particular, his distinction between “law on the books” and “law in action” supplies an influential 
antecedent of this distinction. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 
(1910). 
28. E.g., Oscar Schachter, McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy, 79 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 266, 268 (1985). 
522 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  [Vol. 34: 517 
 
four intellectual tasks, 29  seven dimensions of the social process, 30  seven 
decision functions,31 and eight values.32 Yet this is one reason why the School, 
for all its apparent complexity, has proven so durable and attractive, not only 
to U.S. lawyers, but to generations of foreign students. It strives to identify 
and map the factors that lawyers would ideally know before advising others 
about, making, or appraising decisions in any legal environment: from the 
microlegal system governing “Looking, Staring, and Glaring,”33 to domestic 
legal systems of varying levels of stability and order, to the dynamic and often 
disorganized processes of international law. 
One of Reisman’s signature contributions to the New Haven School lies 
in his ability to expound its methods succinctly—to show, despite its facial 
complexity, how practical it proves.34  Consider one example: Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon asks you to advise the United Nations on how best to 
restore a degree of order sufficient for the supply of humanitarian aid to 
Somalia’s people to resume.35 How, as a lawyer, would you approach this 
problem? Reliance on text, precedents, and logical operations performed on 
traditional legal sources may make good sense in judicial or arbitral fora: 
contrary to a common misconception, the New Haven School jurist would not 
counsel, for example, the transnational business lawyer in an arbitration to 
engage in an “endless quest for shared expectations, value preferences and 
power relations on a global scale.”36 In that context, familiar lawyerly tasks 
would be contextually appropriate, and insofar as traditional legal materials 
(texts, precedents, etc.) may be expected to be authoritative and controlling in 
context, the New Haven School jurist would be as likely to rely upon them as 
any other. But often the international lawyer’s tasks defy resort to traditional 
methods and sources, which at best reveal the myth system rather than the 
operational code of a legal system. 
In the context of seeking to effect the resumption of humanitarian aid in 
Somalia, formal legal sources alone would be manifestly inadequate to the 
task. This is not to say that they don’t matter; only that their contextual 
relevance differs immensely. They may supply information about normative 
trends or preferred policy outcomes. But textual reliance alone would be 
absurd. To the New Haven School jurist, however, it would be equally 
mistaken to characterize the situation in Somalia as legal anarchy. Where a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
29. Clarification of perspective, selection of appropriate focal lenses, mapping of community 
processes, and deliberation culminating in choice—itself a process subdivided into five steps: goal 
clarification, trend analysis, factor analysis, predictions, and invention of alternatives. Michael Reisman, 
1995 Seibenthaler Lecture, A Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the “Political Superior,” 23 N. KY. 
L. REV. 605, 613-20 (1996). 
30. Participants, perspectives, situations, bases of power, strategies, outcomes, and effects. 
Reisman, supra note 23, at 4, 13. 
31. Intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal. 
Id. at 4. 
32. Power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, and rectitude. Myres S. 
McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 
53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 12-13 (1959). 
33. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS 21 (1999). 
34. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 4, at 3; Reisman, supra note 23, at 1; W. Michael Reisman, 
The View from the New Haven School of International Law, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 118 (1992). 
35. I have adapted this example from Reisman’s 2007 Hague Academy lectures. 
36. Schachter, supra note 28, at 268. 
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community exists, so does law. The legal systems (plural) within the 
politically anarchic state of Somalia would be quite complex and variable. But 
the careful jurist would find that diverse processes of authoritative and 
controlling decision indeed exist, overlap, and interact throughout Somalia. 
So how should the international lawyer plausibly think about Secretary-
General Ban’s assignment in Somalia? With whom should she deal? To be 
effective, she must first be able to identify all the participants, understand their 
roles, appreciate their modes of decision, and comprehend their relationships 
to one another. She would likely find the local scene controlled by a complex 
blend of private armies, clans, criminal gangs, multinational corporations 
seeking to protect their investments, agents of foreign governments trying to 
promote political or economic interests, religious leaders with authority 
among sectors of the local populace, nongovernmental organizations trying to 
ameliorate sickness and hunger, and transnational terrorist networks seeking 
to establish a safe haven. She would need to identify the relevant loci of 
authority and control that together would determine the likely efficacy of 
efforts to instantiate new norms—in this case, norms that might enable aid 
supplies to resume. But where, as in Somalia, effective institutions do not 
exist, she would also need to consider how to craft legal arrangements so that 
either (1) politically relevant actors perceive them as in their self-interest, or 
(2) external actors may be mobilized, if necessary, to deploy coercion—
which, it should be stressed, need not mean violence; it includes diplomatic, 
ideological, and economic, as well military, means. 
Beyond mapping the decision process for purposes of prediction and 
efficacy in a range of legal settings, the New Haven School seeks to enhance 
that process—to empower individuals to participate effectively in it and to 
promote the optimal shaping and sharing of values. This makes its 
jurisprudence particularly attractive to the disenfranchised. It supplies them 
with the tools to become effective participants in the legal process—and not 
simply politically inferiors, searching for rules to obey. Unlike positivism, the 
New Haven School encourages lawyers to adopt the perspective of the 
political superior, a perspective particularly well suited to international law. 
The instability, decentralization, and diversity of the international system, 
while often lamentable, generates ample opportunities for lawyers to shape 
and creatively influence international law. The School seeks to identify those 
opportunities as a means to empower lawyers “to influence the way social 
choices are continuously made about the production and distribution of 
resources, including considerations about the ways that decisions should be 
made about those things.”37 
Because, in international law, the convergence of authority and control 
is often the exception rather than the rule, the practice of international law 
requires, as Reisman has often said, the cultivation of realism, especially 
about the role of power.38 Yet the extent to which “power trumps” in many 
areas of international law must not, as he has been equally quick to insist, lead 
lawyers to lose their sense of indignation at injustice and violations of human 
                                                                                                                                                                         
37. Reisman, supra note 29, at 616-17 (emphasis added). 
38. Reisman, supra note 4, at 10, 13. 
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dignity. A parochial focus on power, without recognizing that all power is 
relative, and without the creative formulation and pursuit of goals, culminates 
in nihilism—or in a sterile intellectualism that denies the efficacy of 
international law without appreciating the extent to which this kind of 
cynicism is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Understanding power’s role in 
international law does not mean apologizing for it: 
That, international law notwithstanding, a large state will intervene in the affairs of a 
smaller state if it deems its own security threatened does not mean that it is right for it to 
do so. . . . It does mean that people in the smaller or larger state who are trying to develop 
a realistic set of matter-of-fact expectations . . . will be wise to put this possibility into 
their reckoning.39 
How, then, can international lawyers ultimately be effective in a system 
in which myth system and operational code frequently diverge? The answer 
lies in another of Reisman’s key contributions to the New Haven School: If 
every legal system can best be understood in terms of a continuous flow of 
normative communications with varying levels of authority and control, then 
the more authoritative the communication, the less it will need to rely on 
coercion; conversely, the less authoritative the communication, the more law 
must rely on coercion. That is why well-ordered legal systems with 
authoritative formal institutions seldom need to rely on overt coercion to 
preserve the law or compel enforcement. Effective institutions would be 
preferable in the international system as well. Yet until international law 
reaches that point (and that day is surely not near), effective international 
lawyering requires crafting arrangements such that sufficient numbers of 
politically relevant participants see those arrangements as in their self-
interest. That, in brief, is what a jurisprudence of realistic idealism in 
international law requires. The legacy of Reisman’s jurisprudence of realistic 
idealism emerges not only in his scholarship and practice, but in the many 
students and colleagues, including those in attendance today, whose 
intellectual and professional lives he has indelibly marked. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
39. Reisman, supra note 23, at 9 (emphasis added). 
